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STATEMENT OF CASE
The Respondent concurs in the statement of the case as
set forth by the Appellant.
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
Respondent concurs in the statement of the disposition
of the case as set forth by Appellant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The above case was presented to the Court upon stipulated
facts as set forth by the Appellant with which the Respondent
basically agrees with certain notable exceptions which are
set forth below:
The title to the "Slaugh House" was at all times, since
its purchase in 1967 in the name of her former husband,
Woodey B. Searle, (Civil 5790, T.R. 243, lines 15-20).

The

rents and profits from the "Slaugh House" were deposited in
the Searle Cattle Company, a company owned wholley by Woodey
B. Searle's bank account (deposition of Woodey B. Searle,
page 21).

There have never been prepared any Articles of

Partnership of the Diamond Hills Hotel nor any Articles of
Partnership of Searle Brothers (deposition of Woodey B.
Searle, page 16).

No inventory has ever been made of the
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particular assets of either partnership; only accounts have
been kept where all rents, etc., were comingled and lumped
together.

Nothing was broken down (deposition of Woodey B.

Searle, page 18).
Woodey B. Searle, the father of the plaintiffs Rance,
Rhett, and Randy Searle, and the defendant in the divorce
action, has at all times been the agent of the plaintiffs,
Rance Searle, Rhett Searle, and Randy Searle and as such he
received the sum of $500 per year.

He is still acting in

that capacity (deposition of Woodey B. Searle, page 4-5;
also deposition of Randy Searle, page 12; also deposition of
Rhett Searle, page 3).
The Fourth Judicial District Court by order of the
Honorable

Ju~ge

George E. Ballif, after a full hearing and a

presentation of evidences, ruled that the "Slaugh House" was
property belonging to Woodey B. Searle along.

Following

motions to amend and motions for new trial, Judge Ballif
reaffirmed his original order which awarded the "Slaugh
House" to Edlean Searle, the former wife of Woodey B. Searle
and the defendant in this case.

See:

"Amended Decree of

Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," Civil
5790.

Noteworthy is the statement of Judge Ballif in his

ruling, as late October 1974, denying a motion for further

-2-
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proceedings re the "Slaugh House" because the title to it
had been fully legated previously.
ARGill1ENT
The lower Court did not err in holding that the Decree
of Divorce in Civil No. 5790 was binding upon the Appellants.
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE TITLE TO THE
SLAUGH HOUSE HAD BEEN PROPERLY DETERMINED IN CIVIL NO. 5790.
As indicated, the lower Court, after considering the
matter determined that the title to the "Slaugh House" had
been fully litigated in Civil No. 5790 (Searle vs. Searle).
This case was the divorce case and was the subject of long
and extended inquiry by the Court.

The Court there determined

that the "title to the Slaugh House" was in the father of
the plaintiffs, Woodey B. Searle, (see amended Decree of
Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Searle
vs. Searle, Civil No. 5790, Uintah County, State of Utah).
The Honorable Judge George E. Ballif awarded the said "Slaugh
House to the wife in the divorce action, Edlean Searle, she
now is the defendant in this action.

Subsequently, motions

were made by Woodey B. Searle to have the Court reconsider
the title to the "Slaugh House" and the Court in its ruling
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dated October 10, 1974 reaffirmed its original position set
forth in the Amended Decree, dated May 17, 1973 and denied
the motion stating that the matter had been fully litigated.
Civil No. 5790 (Searle vs. Searle) was appealed to the Utah
State Supreme Court where the decision of the trial court
was affirmed unanimously, Edlean Searle, plaintiff and
respondent, vs. Woodey B. Searle, defendant and appellant,

522 P2d 697.
Thus insofar as either Woodey or his former wife Edlean
were concerned the question of the title to the "Slaugh
House" was fully decided and regardless of how the Court
would have ruled, they or either of them would have been
bound.
Respondent contends that no title ever was in the names
of the plaintiffs in this suit.

The scant record

availabl~

shows that since its purchase in 1967 there never was title
to the "Slaugh House" was never in the name of anyone except
Woodey B. Searle, till the Court by its decree awarded it to
the Defendant in this suit.

She immediately possessed the

premises and improved them and treated them as her own.
Respondent submits that unless the Court can, from the facts
presented, find that ownership was in someone other than
Woodey B. Searle at the time of the divorce _decree the order
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of the divorce decree must stand.

It is admitted that the

plaintiffs are nowhere to be found in the chain of title to
the "Slaugh House", nor is there anything extant to so
indicate by way of memorandum or document their ownership.
The only thing

availabl~

is account records which are in-

conclusive, incomplete and are comingled with other properties
(deposition of Woodey B. Searle, page 18).
We are asked to believe that by some strange manner
title to the "Slaugh House" or a part of it got into the
names of the plaintiffs in this case, merely by virtue of a
check that was apparently issued to pay for it.

This is

absurd, when Woodey B. Searle in his deposition states that
the Searle Cattle Company, and other accounts, were not
broken down and especially when rents from the "Slaugh
House" were paid to the Searle Cattle Company which he alone
owned, (deposition of Woodey B. Searle, pages 18 & 21).
The Court below based upon the facts presented to it
found that the title to the property (Slaugh House) had baen
fully litigated in the divorce action.
Respondent further submits that the decision of the
lower Court, was based upon the facts before it should be
sustaining by the appellate Court.
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POINT II
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE APPELLANTS
PLAINTIFFS WERE COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED BY REASON OF RES
JUDICATA IN THE DIVORCE CASE IN SEARLE VS. SEARLE FROM
CLAIMING TITLE TO THE SLAUGH HOUSE.
Appellants argue that they should not be bound by
l~we~ Court~

~he

order since they were not parties to it --

though it is readily admitted that they were all of the age
of majority at the time of the divorce action; that they
were partners with Woodey B. Searle and that Woodey B.
Searle was their agent (manager).

They further contend

th~t

the rule of mutuality and privity were not present and that
would foreclose their right to be heard -- though they admit
that the res of the law suit (title to the Slaugh House) was
decided by the previous Court.

All of the pleadings,

motions, admissions, etc., and the inferences to be derived
therefrom must be considered by the lower Court (Fredrick
May and Company vs. Dunn, 13 Utah 2nd 40, 368 P2d 266)
not just the complaint as stated by the Appellant.

It is

submitted that the decision of the lower Court in this
action was based upon all of the information before it in
this matter.

Thus, the appellate Court is faced with the

question, did the? lower Court have information and facts

-6-
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sufficient before it to find that the issue raised (title to
the Slaugh House) was litigated and that res judicata forbids
a relitigation of the title, and are the plaintiffs estopped
from pursuing this actions?

Respondent submits the answer

is in the affirmative.
The general rule relative to res judicata and estoppel
is stated, as follows:
In determining the plea of res judicata, three questions
are pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior
judication identical with the one presented in the
action in question? Was there a final judgment on its
merits? Was the party against whom the plea is asserted
a party or in privity wjth a party to the prior adjudication?
(Bernhard vs Bank of America, 122 P2d 892)
This is the better reasoned rule and the foregoing case
has become the generally accepted statement of the law in
the majority of jurisdiction in the United States.
In the instant case, applying the question of the
Bernhard case, the answers are all in the affirmative.
Civil No. 5790,

(Searle vs. Searle) decided the title to the

"Slaugh House" which is raised by this case; the judgment in
Civil No. 5790,

(Searle vs. Searle) was final and was a

judgment on its merits; and again the parties to the action,
the plaintiffs, were and are still in privity with the
defendant, their father,
5790,

in the prior action, Civil No.

(Searle vs. Searle).

-7-
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Woodey B. Searle was and continued to be the agent of
the plaintiffs at all times before and after the initiation
of the present litigation, in fact he managed all their
affairs (see depositions of Woodey B. Searle, pages 4-5;
deposition of Randy Searle, page 12; and deposition of Rhett
Searle, page 3).
Speaking of privity and mutuality, there are some cases
explaining these principals and why privities are bound;
these are where the parties sought to be bound by the judgment
are principal and agent, master and servant, indernnitor and
indemnitee, and lessor and lessee.
70 Utah 534 262 2P 266)

(See, Taylor vs. Barker,

Thus, in the instant case the

agency being established between Woodey B. Searle and his
sons, the plaintiffs, this agency precludes the relitigation
of the title to the "Slaugh House" in a subsequent action.
(See Tietelbaum Furs Inc. vs. Dominican Insurance Co.
375 P2d 439)' where a decision in a criminal case was held
res judicata the right to legitate a question decided in the
criminal case.

(See also, Paulos vs. Janetakos, Ex of

Estate of 142 ALR 1237, and subsequent annotations of same
volume.)
The Court is directed to weight of authority which
permits the use of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and
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more over holding the rule of mutuality inoperative and deed
letter (see DeWitt vs. Hall 1967 NY case 19 NY 2d 141, 225
NE 2d 195, 31 ALR 3rd 1035).
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT RULED CORRECTLY THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE
ESTOPPED FROM LITIGATING THE TITLE OF THE SLAUGH HOUSE.
In addition to the doctrine of collateral estoppel or
judgment by estoppel which invokes the doctrine of res
judicata above mentioned, the plaintiffs are and should be
debarred from asserting any claim to the property (Slaugh
House) awarded to the defendant in the prior divorce action.
The rule is well established that one who stands by and sees
another expend money or land under a belief that he has the
right or title thereto will not be permitted setup or assert
his claim to said land, or as otherwise stated, "If a person
maintains silence when he ought to speak equity will debar
him from speaking when conscience requires him to be silent."
(See, Allen vs. Cameron 8 Utah 8; Murphy vs. Humphrey 23
Utah 633; Tanner vs. Provo Reservoir Company, et. al 99
Utah 158 103 P2d 234; Saylor vs. Kentucky Cardinal Coal
Corp. 205 Ky 724 266 S.W. 388, 50 ALR 666 with annotations
50 ALR 668 to 973.)
In the present case all of the plaintiffs were of the
age of majority at the time of the divorce action.
-9-

They had
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every reason to know the status of the Court decree entered
by Judge Ballif.
Woodey B. Searle.

They were partners with their father
They emphasized that their father, agent

and manager, at all times considered them and discussed with
them the status of their property,

(see deposition of Randy

Searle, Page 12-13; deposition of Rhett, page 3).

Now to

permit these plaintiffs to, claim the property from their
mother, the defendant, who has improved it, possessed it,
and rented and used it for years, would be an unconscionable
wrong.

By their silence the plaintiffs are now estopped

from asserting any claim to the "Slaugh House."
Their silence has been pronounced from 1974 till the commencement of this action.
As pointed out above, the failure of the plaintiffs to
disaffirm the transfer of the "Slaugh House" to defendant,
their mother, constituted ratification of what was done.
Note, the Supreme Court stated in Zeese vs. Estate of
Siegel 534 P2d 85, as follows:
"Ratification relates back to the time when the unauthorized act was done; and although the act may have
[been] without any precedent authority, ratification
creates the relation of principal and agent."
Thus, the plaintiffs had a duty to disaffinn their
father's statement, under oath, that the "Slaugh House" was

-10-
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his, if indeed it wasn't, at the time of the statement or at
least at the time the divorce was granted.
Again, ~ote the statements of the Utah Supreme Court
quoting from Williston Contract in Moses vs. Archie McFarland

& Sons 230 P2d 571 at page 573:
"Even silence with full knowledge of the facts may
manifest affirmance and thus operate as ratification."
Also from the Utah case of Lowe vs. April Induscries,
Inc. 531 P2d 1297:
"Ratification is expressed or implied.
Implied where
it arises under circumstances of acquiescence or where a
duty to disaffirm is not promptly exercised."
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT RULED CORRECTLY BECAUSE A PARTNERSHIP IS
LIABLE TO A THIRD PERSON FOR REPRESENTATIONS OR ACTS OF
ANOTHER PARTNER.
The statutes of the State of Utah provide as follows:
§48-1-8, Partnership bound by admission of partner
An admission or representation made by any partner
concerning partnership affairs within the scope of his
authority as conferred by this chapter is evidence
against ~he partnership.
§48-1-10, Partnership bound by partners wrongful act
Whereby any wrongful act or omission of any partner
acting in the ordinary course of business of the
partnership or with the authority of his copa7tners
loss or injury is cused to any person, not being a

-11-
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partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred,
the partnership is liable therefore to the same extent
as the partner so ailing or omitting to act.
§48-1-12, Nature of partnership liability all partners
are liable:
(1)
Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership under Sections 48-1-10 and
48-1-11. ...

In the present case there is no dispute as to the
existence of a partnership between the Searle boys, Rance,
Rhett and Randy and their father, Woodey B. Sea::: le: the boys
together owning fifty per cent and the father owning fifty
per cent.

The defendant Diamond Hills Motel was likewise a

partnership owned in the same proportion.

Woodey B. Searle

was the general manager for the boys and he conducted the
affairs of the partnerships, as such he enjoyed and exercised
almost unlimited authority to deal and do as he chose relative
to the partnership assets.

He received remuneration for his

services and by virtue of his being manager, was clothed
with more authroity than is the case in usual agency relations!;
The general rule is stated that the powers of an agent are
particularly broad in the case of one acting as a general
agent or manager; such a position presupposses a degree of
confidence reposed and investiture with liberal powers for

-12-
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the exercise of judgment and discretion.

(See, Ackerman vs.

Jennings 140 A 760, 56 ALR 1127, Restatement Agency (2d ed)
§73, Scholz vs. Lever 7 Wash 2d 76, 109 P2d 294; Monarch
Lumber vs. Wallace 132 Montana 163 314 P2d 884)
Woodey B. Searle testified in the divorce trial that he
owned the "Slaugh House" (transcript in Civil No. 5790).
stated on inquiry as to whose name it was in.
name solely."

He

"It is in my

Such a statement made by Woodey was either

the truth or it was a falsehood being perpetrated upon the
partnerships of which he was a fifty per cent owner.

If he

did falsely testify, then he, because of his broad power as
manager and general agent of the partnerships bound the
partnership by his representation.

Thus, the defendant in

the present case may not be challenged in her ownership of
the "Slaugh House" by the principals to the partnership.
The partnership is bound by the admission of the managing
partner §48-1-8 UCA.

For arguments sake, the partnership is

bound by the wrongful act of the managing partner representing his sole ownership in the "Slaugh House" and by the
managers failure or omission to set the record straight,
§48-1-10 UCA.

The partnership is bound by the breach of

trust of the managing partner wherein the third party
(Edlean Searle, the defendant) received the property as part
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of her distributive share in the divorce,

§48-1-11.

This

because Woodey B. Searle knowingly did testify in the
divorce case about property which he now alleges is partnersh
property.

It was certainly within his authority and res-

ponsibility to tell the truth about the partnership.

The

partnership should stand the loss rather than a third party
such as the defendant, plaintiffs mother.
Further, it is an obligation on a partnership and
particularly upon the managing partner to render full and
complete accounts of the partnership.

Discovery by way of

disposition indicates that the only accounting was a cursory
account of income which was comingled by the manager with
his own separate companies, all was lumped together (see
deposition of Woodey B. Searle, page 18).

Under the general

partnership, statute of Utah, Title 48, Chapter 1, there is
an obligation, as above-mentioned, to inventory the assets
for the benefit of the partnership, this has not been done

which further detracts from any creditability the partnerships
may have.

It would indeed appear that these were merely

entities of convenience and had no real basis in fact since
the assets, profits, rents, etc. could move apparently with
rapidity from one to another at the convenience of the
parties, particularly the manager.
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POINT V
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT
NEVER RELINQUISHED HER STATUTORY INTEREST IN THE SLAUGH
HOUSE.
As mentioned above, the defendant received from Woodey
B. Searle certain real property part of which was the
"Slaugl1 Ho11_se."

No·.., plaintiffs and their father claim an

interest in the "Slaugh House" asserting it was partnership
property.

It is admitted that title was solely in the name

of Woodey B. Searle and that he held title to it in that
capacity during his marriage to Edlean, the defendant, and
further it is admitted that she at no time ever made a
relinquishment of her distributive share to which she is
entitled under the provisions of §74-4-3 UCA 1953.

In fact

the Court in its decision in Civil No. 5790 decreed certain
lands part of which was the "Slaugh House"; these lands are
at least properly part of the property she would be entitled
to receive under §74-4-3 UCA and had Woodey died prior to
the divorce, her claim to the one-third of the real estate
to which she had made no relinquishment would have become
hers (see In Re Oslters Estate 286 P2d 796).

-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT VI
THE PLAINTIFFS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION FROM
CLAIMING TITLE TO THE SLAUGH HOUSE.
Utah Code Annotated §78-12-5 provides:
No actions shall for the recovery of real property
or for the possession thereof shall be maintained,
unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor,
granter or predecessor was seized or possessed of the
property in question within seven years before the
cormnencement of the action.
The plaintiffs cannot claim any ownership to the
"Slaugh House" since they never at anytime had any ownership
therein nor in the chain of title.

The present defendant

ties her title, through the court order to her former
husband, Woodey B. Searle, who took title in 1967 well over
seven years ago.

Plaintiffs cannot claim through their

father, since the court order acted as a conveyance vesting
title in defendant Edlean Searle.

Also, there is no an-

cestoral relationship claimable till the ancestor dies and
the claimants can claim as his heirs,

(see Bailey vs. Bailey

25 Mich 185; McCarthy vs. Marsh 5 NY 275; Springer vs.
Fortune 2 H-"nd" (Ohio) 52; Wheatcrafc vs. Hall 106 Ofiio St

21, D8 NE 368).
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CONCLUSION
Respondents assert that the decision of the lower Court
should be sustained and it should stand because of the
following:
(1)

The facts before the Court sustain its judgment

and the appellants tribunal should not disturbe the decision
based upon facts.
(2)

Arguendo if there is any basis, though not admitted

by respondent, the plaintiffs are debarred from resisting
the ruling of the lower Court holding that Civil No. 5790 is
res judicata to the present case because of collateral
estoppel.
(3)

The principals of equity forbid and further estop

the plaintiffs from challenging the decision when they
failed to timely raise any objection to the divorce courts
ruling.
(4)

The statutes and rules of partnership hold the

plaintiffs who are partners liable to third parties who
might have been injured, in this case their mother.
(5)

The defendant here received the property in

question and she has made no relinquishment of her statutory
share.
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(6)

And that plaintiffs are barred by the statute of

limitations from claiming the "Slaugh House."
(7)

And, an over the shoulder observation, not supported

by authority on the part of defendant, is that this case has
been brought and instigated on the part of a disappointed
former spouse who knowing that there was no further avenue
open in the divorce case has sought to retrieve some of his
lost property.
The order dismissing the complaint with prejudice
should be sustained and affirmed.
submitted,
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